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INTRODUCTION

American students are being educated in segregated and unequal
schools more than ever since Brown v. Board of Education' struck down the
separate-but-equal doctrine. 2 In California, black and Latino students have
faced decades of segregated and unequal education. 3 Indeed, California is
the most segregated state in the nation-it has the lowest share of blacks in
white schools than any other state.4 Los Angeles, which might be considered
a progressive city, is the "most residentially segregated large metropolitan
area in the U.S. in terms of the even distribution of Latinos and whites." 5
Professor Irving Joyner notes that Brown v. Boardof Education has become

1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2011) (concluding that while interracial contact increased in the
decade after Brown, various factors prevented a larger increase); JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991) (examining the gap in school
resources between the rich and poor); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education:School Choice
as Racial Subordination,99 IOWA L. REV. 1083 (2014) (analyzing racial constraints on school
choice); Chinh Q. Le, Racially IntegratedEducation and the Role of the FederalGovernment,
88 N.C. L. REV. 725 (2010) (critiquing the role the federal in school integration); Leland Ware
& Cara Robinson, Charters, Choice, and Resegregation, 11 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Gary
Orfield, Reviving the Goal of an IntegratedSociety: A 21st Century Challenge, CIv. RTS.
PROJECT (Jan. 2009), https://perma.cc/8GHX-CFYC (showing that the segregation statistics
from enrollment data submitted to the National Center for Education Statistics reflects an
increase in racial segregation of African American and Latino students in public schools).
3. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Crawford v. Bd.
of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976); Gary Orfield & Jongyeon Ee, Segregating California's
Future:Inequality and its Alternative 60 years after Brown v. Board of Education, Civ. RTS.
PROJECT (May 2014), https://perma.cc/66JY-XK2f.
4. See generally Orfield & Ee, supra note 3 (calculating the percentage of blacks in
white schools in California).
5. Id. at 25.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol41/iss1/1

2

Oluwole: A National Lesson on the Dereliction and Declension of Educationa
2019] THE CAUTIONARY TALE OF CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOLS

3

"an empty victory"6 for many, which ultimately led to the "non-education of
African-American students."'
Research reveals that minorities face a
disadvantage in instruction and learning because of an "overall pattern of
inequitable distribution" of resources.' This speaks to the ineffectiveness of
education reforms, such as school finance litigation and desegregation cases,
9
in adequately equalizing educational opportunities.

6. Irving Joyner, Pimping Brown v. Board of Education: The Destruction of AfricanAmerican Schools and the Mis-Education of African-American Students, 35 N.C. CENT. L.
REV. 160, 191 (2013).
7. Id. at 197; see also Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE
L.J. 1285 (1992) (arguing that implementing a curriculum focused on raising self-esteem and
academic performance in black students is consistent with Brown).
8. Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1597,
1634 (2016); see also Ethan Hutt & Aaron Tang, The New Education MalpracticeLitigation,
99 VA. L. REv. 419 (2013) (proposing an "education malpractice" claim students can have
against chronically ineffective teachers); William S. Koski, Teacher Collective Bargaining,
Teacher Quality, and the Teacher Quality Gap: Toward a Policy Analytic Framework, 6
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 67 (2012) (presenting an analytical framework to assess proposed
teacher employment and collective bargaining reforms); Jenny DeMonte & Robert Hanna,
Looking at the Best Teachers and Who They Teach: Poor Students and Students of Color are
Less Likely to Get Highly Effective Teaching, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 2 (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://perma.cc/7NGB-3ZWN.
9. See Joshua E. Weishart, TranscendingEquality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV.
477, 508 (2014) ("Although public education is often the largest appropriation in state
budgets, funding disparities between high- and low-poverty school districts persist, even in
states in which courts have mandated full funding."); see also Robin D. Barnes, Black
America andSchool Choice: Chartinga New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375 (1997) (discussing
generally failures of desegregation in public schools in America and how school choice may
may address some of those failures); John H. Blume et al., Education and Interrogation:
Comparing Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. Rv. 321 (2005) (analyzing similarities
between Brown and Miranda in their historical significance and integration into American
culture); Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MLAMI L. REV. 577 (2009)
(suggesting there are other ways to achieve equal educational opportunities for minority
students than pursuing a racially diverse student body); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) (illustrating the connection between the failure to
desegregate schools and socioeconomic isolation); Benjamin Michael Superfine, The
Promisesand Pitfalls of TeacherEvaluation andAccountability Reform, 17 RiCH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 591 (2014) (critiquing laws aimed at enhancing teacher evaluation and accountability);
Richard Miyasaki, Comment, Asleep at the School-Bus Wheel: The Success and Failure of
School Desegregationin San Jose Unified School Districtand How to Save It, 45 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 149 (2015 (examining the history segregation in San Jose schools); Nipun
Kant, Teachers, School Spending, and EducationalAchievement: Toward a New Wave of
School Quality Litigation, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2014),
https://perma.cc/S82V-UZCY (arguing that a new legal claim against inequitable and
inadequate distribution of teacher quality may be available).
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Another such ineffective reform is charter schools, which have led to
segregated education and inequities."0 However, a few scholars have argued
that maybe minority parents view segregated charter schools as a "virtue
rather than a vice"' 1 for their children and so they are choosing charter
schools over public schools.' 2 Though, the parents might be doing so with
incomplete information about charter schools, which stymies informed
choices. 3 Even with ill-informed choices, "[t]he charter school movement
has been a major political success, but it has been a civil rights failure."' 4
Nonetheless, the choice campaign to steer families to charter schools
continues because the use of "choice" in the campaign language has a
"sanitizing effect on inequality."' 5
The 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk 6 was the impetus for an
aggressive focus on standardized testing, accountability, and other reforms
10. See James, supra note 2, at 1111; Orfield & Ee, supra note 3, at 35; Jane Tanimura,
Note, Still Separate and Still Unequal: The Need for Stronger Civil Rights Protections in
Charter-EnablingLegislation, 21 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 399, 413 (2012) (arguing that
the charter school movement has failed to racial problems in the public school system);
Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States, CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC.
OUTCOMES, STAN. UNIv. (2009), https://perma.cc/NCZ5-AKQP.
11. James, supra note 2, at 1117.
12. See Jarvis, supra note 7 (arguing that some parents want to send their children to
schools with Afrocentric curriculums); Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The
Jurisprudenceof Choice and Diversity in Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REv. 455 (2005) (examining the impulse towards resegregation in public schools through
school choice); Sarah Rivkin Smoler, Comment, Centric Charter Schools: When Separate
May Be Equal, 10 Nw. J.L. & Soc, POL'Y 319 (2015) (tracing the emergence and development
of centric charter schools, specifically in Chicago).
13. See Barnes, supra note 9, at 2377-78; Courtney A. Bell, All Choices CreatedEqual?
The Role of Choice Sets in the Selection of Schools, 84 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 191 (2009)
(discussing why parents choose certain schools over others); Genevieve Siegel-Hawley &
Erica Frankenberg, Does Law Influence Charter School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal
andState Legislation, 16 MiCH. J. RACE & L. 321, 337 (2011) (explaining that for parents with
limited resources, choosing a school can be challenging); Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve
Siegel-Hawley, Equity Overlooked: Charter Schools and Civil Rights Policy, C.R PROJECT
1, 4 (Nov. 2009), https://perma.cc/L5VN-6NFX (discussing factors like social networks,
language barriers, and socioeconomic status, that limit parents' decisions in school choice).
14. Erica Frankenberg et al., Choice Without Equity: CharterSchool Segregationand the
Need for Civil Rights Standards,Civ. RTS. PROJECT 1, 1 (Jan. 2010), https://pernacc/GU3VUWY5 (emphasis added).
15. James, supra note 2, at 1086. For a discussion of choice programs and their
constitutionality, see Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, It, School Vouchers and Tax
Benefits in FederalandState JudicialConstitutionalAnalysis,65 AM. U. L. REv. 1335 (2016).
16. See Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, CharterSchools: Racial-Balancing
Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2008) [hereinafter RacialBalancing] (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing David Gardner et al., Nat'l Comm'n on
Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The Imperativefor EducationalReform, U.S. DEP'T
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that have distracted from the specific needs of minority students.17 However,
subgroup data tracking on standardized tests and other reforms has
spotlighted educational deficiencies for minority subgroups. 18 Standardized
testing and accountability reforms, such as the No Child Left Behind Act and
the Race to the Top program, have been partly responsible for promoting the
charter school movement as a solution to poor public school and student
performance. 19 Despite this focus on standardized testing, accountability,
and choice, students continue to underperform and racial achievement gaps
have become a staple of the American education system.2"
EDUC. 1, 5 (April 1983), https://perma.cc/736D-TQVV) ("Secretary of Education T.H. Bell
established the [National Commission on Excellence in Education] to conduct an eighteenmonth study in order to determine ways to improve the quality of education in the nation,
given the widespread public perception that something is seriously remiss in our educational
system. The report... entitled A Nation at Risk.").
17. See generally Christopher B. Knaus, Still Segregated, Still Unequal: Analyzing the
Impact of No Child Left Behind on African American Students in THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA 2007: PORTRAIT OF THE BLACK MALE 105 (2007); Betheny Gross & Paul T. Hill,

The State Role in K-12 Education: From Issuing Mandates to Experimentation, 10 HARV. L.
& POL'Y REv. 299 (2016) (critiquing programs implemented by states and the federal
government in public education); Arah N. Shumway, Teacher Tenure Reform in Wyoming:
Bad Teachers Left Behind, 15 Wyo. L. REv. 45 (2015) (analyzing the affect NCLB and
teacher tenure have on student success); Benjamin M. Superfine & Jessica J. Gottlieb, Teacher
Evaluation and Collective Bargaining:The New Frontierof Civil Rights, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 737 (2014) (recommending ways for teachers' unions to work towards providing more
equal and high-quality educational opportunities for all students); Joseph P. Viteritti, The
FederalRole in School Reform: Obama's "Race to the Top," 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2087
(2012).
18. Black, supra note 8 at 1642-46; see Huff & Tang, supranote 8 at 447-49; Nation's
Report Card, National Achievement Level Results, NAT'L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS

(2015), https://perma.cc/SPE7-3WB4.
19. See Brooke Finley, Growing Charter School Segregation and the Need for
Integration in Light of Obama 's Race to the Top Program, 52 SAN Dm-O L. REv. 933, 93744 (2015) (discussing the Race to the Top program); Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Erafor
Desegregation,28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 423, 445-52 (2012) (discussing No Child Left Behind).
20. See Shavar D. Jeffries, Mandated Mediocrity: Modernizing Education Law by
Reducing Mandatesand IncreasingProfessionalDiscretion,23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
45, 62-69 (2013); Viteritti, supra note 17; Pascal D. Forgione, Jr., Achievement in the United
States: ProgressSince A Nation At Risk?, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (April 3, 1998),

https://perma.cc/Z7DD-58SC (examining trends in student performance since the 1970s); F.
Cadelle Hemphill et al., Achievement Gaps: How Hispanic and White Students in Public
Schools Perform in Mathematics and Reading on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (June 2011), https:/perma.cc/Z7DD-58SC;;

Kant, supra note 9; Nation's Report Card, A First Look: 2013 Mathematics and Reading,
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, (Nov. 2013), https://perma.cc/NQ4N-CZWD;

Alan

Vanneman et al., Achievement Gaps: How Black and White Students in Public Schools
Perform in Mathematics and Reading on the National Assessment of EducationalProgress
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (July 2009), https://permacc/E975-Z92L.
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In order to rectify inequities in segregated schools, educational strategy
must again focus on providing equal educational opportunities even where
schools are segregated. We must make equal access to high-quality
teachers 21 a civil rights issue as research shows that high-quality instruction
is integral to effective learning for minorities.2 2 Professor William Koski
reports that "[s]tudy after study has confirmed that teachers with the least
experience and those without credentials are concentrated in poor and
minority schools. 2 3 The "unequal access is sufficiently pervasive that

21. Teacher quality is based on student learning and growth data as well as observations
of instruction as measured in teacher evaluations systems. See generally Laura McNeal, Total
Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 489 (2013)
(proposing ways for schools to maintain teacher rights while also providing space for school
districts to remove ineffective teachers); Superfine, supra note 9 (examining recent laws
aimed at enhancing teacher evaluation and accountability); Elizabeth Powell, Comment, The
Questfor Teacher Quality: Early Lessonsfrom Race to the Top and State Legislative Efforts
Regarding Teacher Evaluations, 62 DEPAUL L. REv. 1061 (2013) (arguing the need for
effective strategies that better identify and increase teacher effectiveness); Daniel Katz, New
York EvaluationsLose in Court,DANIEL KATZ BLOG (May 11,2016), https://perma.cc/URZ2HWCS (describing how a New York court recognized problems with the "Value Added
Modeling" method to evaluate teachers). The use of student data has been criticized, however,
as "a statistical black box which no rational educator or fact finder could see as fair, accurate
or reliable." Id.; see also Todd A. DeMitchell et al., Teacher Effectiveness and Value-Added
Modeling: Building a Pathway to Educational Malpractice?, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 257
(2012); Regina Umpstead et al., The New State ofTeacher Evaluationand Employment Laws:
An Analysis of Legal Actions and Trends, 322 EDUC. LAW. REP. 577, 586 (2015). Since
student data as a measure of teacher quality fails to account for factors beyond the teacher's
control, high-quality teachers could be discouraged from working in minority schools due to
concerns about those factors. Xiaoxia Newton et al., Value-Added Modeling of Teacher
Effectiveness: An Exploration of Stability Across Models and Contexts, 18 EDUC. POL'Y
ANALYSIs ARCHIVES, No. 23, at 19-20 (2010); see also Arah N. Shumway, Teacher Tenure
Reform in Wyoming: Bad Teachers Left Behind, Wyo. L. REv., 15, 45 (2015). Such concerns
linger in addition to the traditional difficulty minority schools have attracting and retaining
highly-quality teachers. See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Teacher Mobility, School
Segregation, and Pay-BasedPolicies to Level the Playing Field(CALDER, Working Paper
No. 44, 2010); Clement (Kirabo) Jackson, Student Demographics, Teacher Sorting, and
TeacherQuality: Evidence From the End of School Desegregation(Cornell, Univ., School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, Working Paper No. 78, 2009).
22. DeMonte & Hanna, supra note 8; Brian Rowan et al., What Large-Scale, Survey
Research Tells Us About Teacher Effects on Student Achievement: Insightsfrom the Prospects
Study ofElementary Schools, 104 TcHRS. C. REc. 1525 (2002); Superfine, supranote 9; Laura
Goe, The Link Between Teacher Quality and Student Outcomes: A ResearchSynthesis, NAT'L
COMPREHENSIVE CTR. FOR TciR. QUALITY (Oct. 2007), https://perma.cc.ZZ5U-TL7F.
23. Koski, supra note 8, at 74; see also Heather G. Peske & Kati Haycock, Teaching
Inequality: How Poor and Minority Students are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality, EDUC.
TRUST 1 (June 2006), https://perma.cc/6QYG-AU8K (describing teacher distribution
nationally).
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scholars argue that it depresses overall national achievement. ' 24 Teachers in
minority schools also face unequal pay and fewer resources relative to their
counterparts in white schools.25 Further, minority schools need equal access
to curriculum and instruction resources, reasonable class sizes, facilities, and
other educational inputs in order to have equal educational opportunities.2 6
Over the years, courts have played a critical role in minority students'
quest for equal educational opportunities:
In the seven decades since Brown abolished state-imposed racial segregation
in schools, courts have played a role in education reform in the United States.
This role has included imposing desegregation decrees, upholding
affirmative action programs, upholding alternatives to public education and
school choice programs, restructuring special education, and striking down
27
school financing schemes.

However, courts have been increasingly reticent to intervene in
educational equality issues. 28 The judicial retreat from the equal education

24. Black, supra note 8, at 1609.
25. See Scott Baker, Testing Equality: The National Teacher Examination and the
NAACP's Legal Campaign to Equalize Teachers' Salaries in the South, 1936-63, 35 HIST.
EDUC. Q. 49 (1995); Koski, supra note 8; Devin R. Bates, Comment, Do Teacher Payfor
Performance Schemes Advance American Education? What Education and Business Can
Learn From Each Other in the EducationReform Movement, 7 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV.
547 (2016).
26. See, e.g., BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN
EDUCATIONAL POLICY (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells, eds. 2005); Max Ciolino, The

Right to an Educationand the Plight of School Facilities:A Legislative Proposal, 19 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 107 (2016); Molly Robertson, Blaming Teacher Tenure is Not the
Answer, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 463 (2015); Lyanne Prieto, Note, "Shocking the Conscience" or
Suffering as Scapegoats?: Why the Vergara Opinion Misinterpretedthe Role that Teachers
and Tenure Play in DisadvantagingPoor andMinority Students, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
85 (2016); Harold Berlak, Race and the Achievement Gap, RETHINKING SCHs., Summer 2001,
at 10; Alan B. Krueger & Diane M. Whitmore, Would Smaller Classes Help Close the BlackWhite Achievement Gap? (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 451, 2001),
https://perma.cc/D3UR-DMSC; Julian R. Betts et al., Equal Resources, Equal Outcomes? The
Distributionof School Resources and Student Achievement in California,PUB. POL'Y INST.
OF CAL. (2000), https://perma.cc/EJ5T-MAH7; Grover J. "Russ" Whitehurst & Matthew M.
Chingos, Class Size: What Research Says and What it Meansfor State Policy, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/PPY7-A6BZ.
27. Michele Aronson, Comment, The Deceptive Promise of Vergara: Why Teacher
Tenure Lawsuits Will Not Improve Student Achievement, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 400-02
(2015) (internal citations omitted).
28. See generally Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Harrowing Through
Narrow Tailoring: Voluntary Race-Conscious Student-Assignment Plans, Parents Involved
and Fisher, 14 WYO. L. REv. 705 (2014) (discussing how courts have increasingly been
unwilling to support educational equality measures such as race-conscious student assignment
plans); see also Black, supranote 8; Jim Hilbert, School Desegregation2.0: What is Required
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reform scene is grounded in the judiciary's reliance on deferential legal
standards in review of reform initiatives, hampering efforts of civil rights
advocates. 29 This creates the need for a more viable standard that advocates
can rely upon in promoting equal educational opportunities. Besides, "[s]tate
courts have been reluctant to take decision-making authority away from
districts, and federal courts have been reluctant to centralize decision-making
at the federal level at the expense of states and districts. '3° This judicial
disengagement has only furthered a separate-but-unequal era.
While public schools were segregated during the separate-but-equal
era, the governing legal standard required schools to maintain equality in
resources between black and white schools.3 1 Also, black communities
exercised control over their schools during the separate-but-equal era. The
current charter school push in California threatens local control as well as
equality between minority schools and white schools. This portends, for
minorities, a legal situation worse than Plessy v. Ferguson.3 2 While Plessy
legally sanctioned segregation, it also demanded equality of education for
minorities. Some black scholars believe that part of Brown's legacy has been
inequality and loss of local control. 3 Even when lauding Brown, some
minorities view it as a case that forced them to be "totally removed from any
direct involvement in how their children would be educated"--something
they enjoyed and lived before Brown.34
The erosion ofjudicial remedies for minorities seeking equal education
opportunities today makes a return to the separate-but-equal legal standard
appealing. After all, students could at least use this standard to demand

to Finally Integrate America's Public Schools, 16 Nw. J. HUM. RTS. 92 (2018); Jim Hilbert,
Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge School
Segregation,46 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2017).
29. Vanessa L. Coleman, The Erosion of Brown I & II and Court Legitimized ReSegregation of Public Schools, 9 S.J. POL'Y & JUST. 95 (2015); Girardeau A. Spann, Good
FaithDiscrimination,23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585 (2015); Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law
for PerformanceEvaluation ofPublic School ProfessionalPersonnel:An Update, 314 EDUC.
L. REP. 1 (2015).
30. Note, EducationPolicy Litigation as Devolution, 128 HARV.L. REv. 929,931 (2015);
see Erwin Chemerinksy, The Segregation and ResegregationofAmerican Public Education:
The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1597 (2003) (calling out the Supreme Court for being a
large reason for today's resegregation).
31. Preston C. Green, III et al., Achieving Racial Equal Educational Opportunity
Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIrv. LiBERT ms 283, 290-92
(2008).
32. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 6, at 168-79 (discussing Brown's impact on AfricanAmerican communities and schools).
34. Id. at 191.
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equality even when schools are segregated, as continues under judiciallysanctioned de facto segregation. This fight for equality is even more glaring,
given that the United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms."35
This Article is based on a review of the arguments of some scholars that
a return to Plessy would generally best serve minority students.36 Part I of
this Article presents the judicial trend of deference to school decisions,
providing little to no recourse in current jurisprudence for racial educational
inequalities. This Part also reveals the failure of school finance litigation to
take race into account, thus furthering the lack of racial equality. Part II
discusses the Plessy v. Ferguson37 separate-but-equal doctrine as a means for
promoting racial equality. Part III discusses charter school segregation in
California and the need for racial equality. The California segregation is a
cautionary note for other states. As research shows, California "[b]lack and
Latino students are strongly concentrated in schools that have far lower
quality, according to state Academic Performance, Index (API) ratings. '"38
Part TV highlights the threat to local control over local schools in California
as "rogue charter authorizers" expand into minority districts, and nonprofits
like Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation seek to enroll half of Los Angeles'
public school students in charter schools. It argues that states should
consider retaining local control by preventing outside charter authorizers
from invading minority communities that did not authorize them with school
sites, resource centers, and satellite campuses. If such invasion is not
prevented, minority districts may be oversaturated with charter schools, thus
taking money away from public schools as money follows the student. Part
V presents the conclusion.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND CONSEQUENT LACK
OF RECOURSE FOR RACIAL EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY

Part I of this Article presents the judicial trend of deference to school
decisions that has emerged since the judicial engagement of Brown v. Board

35. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
36. See, e.g., Rick Guzman, Comment, An Argument for a Return to Plessy v. Ferguson:
Why Illinois Should Reconsider the Doctrine of "Separatebut Equal" Public Schools, 29 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 149 (2008); Joyner, supra note 6.
37. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.

38. Orfield & Ee, supra note 3, at 3.
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of Education,39 leaving racial educational inequalities little to no judicial
remedies. This section also reveals the failure of school finance litigation to
take race into account, thus furthering the lack of racial equality.
Additionally, it discusses the Vergarav. State of California4 ° decision, which
continued the deferential trend, disappointing advocates who sought equality
through teacher tenure litigation.
A.

Desegregationand Devolution of JudicialEngagement
1. Brown I andII with the Liberty of "All DeliberateSpeed"',

Brown I was a seminal decision as it was the first case to question the
validity of the separate-but-equal doctrine since Plessy. Indeed, in Brown I,
the United States Supreme Court declared that the separate-but-equal
doctrine violated the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.42
The Court could have followed precedent and deferred to the local districts
in the case continuing equalization of the segregated facilities, curriculums,
teacher qualifications and salaries, and other factors. Instead, in ruling that
segregated education was "inherently unequal," the Court chose to look at
segregation through social justice lenses while relying on policy,
psychological, and empathetic arguments about the plight of minority
students.4 3 The Court reasoned that segregated education creates a sense of
inferiority in minority students that could do lasting damage.44 Additionally,
the Court explained that an integrated education is so vital to ensuring that
children of all races grow up to be culturally responsive and productive
citizens equipped to function in our democratic society.4 5
In a sense, Brown I was a call for equality particularly since the Court
found inequality inheres in separateness. 46
Thus, post-Brown I

39. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.

40. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).

42. The United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause provides, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
43. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.

44. Id at 494. Contrast that with Plessy v. Fergusonwhere the Court stated that "[l]aws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought
into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in
the exercise of their police power." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
45. Brown 1,347 U.S. at 493.
46. Guzman, supra note 36, at 151.
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desegregation litigation sought equality as an element of desegregation
though the search for equality was not as expressly stated as under the
separate-but-equal doctrine.
While the Court found segregation
unconstitutional in Brown I, it postponed the remedial decision
(desegregation decrees) until Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11)4 1 to

allow the parties to brief the court about appropriate decrees in light of
complex diverse local conditions.48 Ultimately, in Brown II, the Court ruled
that schools must desegregate with "all deliberate speed."4 9 Given the
flexibility in this desegregation decree, school districts took liberty with the
"deliberate" component of the decree, often avoiding or delaying
desegregation without fully providing equality.50
2. Retreat to School Choice-The Refuge for White Flight
Prince Edward County, Virginia, for example, defied the desegregation
decree by refusing to enroll minorities.5 1 The state constitution was also
amended to authorize public funds for students to attend private or public
schools.52 This was the forerunner of school choice and it was designed to
allow white students who did not want to attend school with black students
to transfer. This is similar to what researchers Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve
Siegel-Hawley, Jia Wang, and Gary Orfield observed generally in the West,
including California, where they found "signs of white flight from regular
public schools" to charter schools as the minority population in regular
public schools has increased.5 3
In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, the
Supreme Court confronted a freedom-of-choice scheme that included state
repeal of compulsory attendance, incentivizing the establishment of private
schools through tax credits, and tuition grants for students to explore their
choice of schools. 54 Rather than desegregate, Prince Edward County closed
its public schools and the white students then attended segregated white
private schools; this left minorities with limited opportunities for private
schools.55 The United States Supreme Court disregarded the school district's
plea for judicial abstention, highlighting the urgent need for judicial
47. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

48.
49.
50.
1976).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.at 298-99; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
Brown 1,349 U.S. at 301.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal.
Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Id. at 221.
Frankenberg et al., supra note 14, at 30.
Griffin, 377 U.S. 218.
Id. at 222-23.
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intervention and pent up frustration at the delay tactics. 56 Specifically, the
Court stated that "the issues here imperatively call for decision
now .... There has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough
speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in Brown v. Board
ofEducation. ' 5
The Court noted that the choice program had merely furthered
segregation and denial of equal educational opportunities for minoritiesthe same situation currently existing with California charter schools-in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 58 The Court frowned on the use of
public funds to support segregated choice schools and emphasized that
"relief needs to be quick and effective."59 Further, the Court stated
emphatically that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out."60
Indeed, the choice programs post-Brown were originally conceived as a
subtle and, at times overt, attempt to avoid desegregation.6 1 Erica
Frankenberg and her colleagues point out that today "charters serve as
havens for white flight from public schools."62
In striking down the choice program in Griffin, the Court stated that
courts have significant power to provide remedies to promote
desegregation.63 This trend continued in Green v. County School Board of
New Kent County64 where the Supreme Court ruled that a school choice
program
is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally required
end-the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. If the means
prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other
means must be used to achieve this end. The school officials have the

56. Id. at 225, 229.
57. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 234.
61. Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 13; David Hinojosa & Karolina Walters,
How Adequacy Litigation Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Brown [But How It Can Get Us
Closer], 2014 MICH. ST. L. REv. 575 (2014); Joyner, supra note 6; Siegel-Hawley &
Frankenberg, supra note 13.
62. Frankenberg et al., supra note 14, at 5; see also Civil Rights Project, Choice Without
Equity: Charter School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards, CIv. RTS.
PROJECT (Jan. 2010), https://perma.cc/J8D7-F34U (recording the racial composition of
California charter schools).
63. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231-33.
64. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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continuing duty to65take whatever action may be necessary to create a unitary,
nonracial system.
Unfortunately, charter schools today have become a "sacred talisman"
despite the rampant segregation, with little to no judicial recourse. This is a
far cry from the days of Green. In that case, the school district created "a
plan by which every student, regardless of race, may 'freely' choose the
school he will attend" as part of its effort to achieve unitary status. 66 The
Supreme Court ruled that the choice program could not be an end in itself;
instead, it must be evident that the program is part of a good faith effort to
desegregate.6 7 The Court emphasized that choice programs would not be
upheld if there were more efficacious means to address segregation more
promptly.6" The Court upbraided the choice program in Green for delaying
desegregation, and for shifting to students and parents, through the guise of
choice, the responsibility Brown imposed on schools to desegregate. 69 Thus,
the Court was willing to intervene to strike down a choice program that
furthered segregation and the concomitant inequalities. The Court ruled that
schools needed to achieve racial equality in facilities, faculty, staff, student
body, extracurricular activities, and transportation. 7" These are the "Green
factors" and segregated charter schools today should strive to ensure equality
on these factors even in the absence of judicial enforcement.
On the same day it decided Green, the Supreme Court again
emphasized in Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, City of Jackson,
Tennessee7 that school choice programs (referred to as "free transfer plans"
in the case) must enhance desegregation rather than further segregation or
delay desegregation. In that case, the Court criticized the choice program
for allowing white and black students to retreat "to the comfortable security
of the old, established discriminatory pattern."7 2 Accordingly, the Court

65. Id. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bowman v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 382
F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 246 (1991) ("Courts have used the terms 'dual' to denote a school system which
has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and 'unitary' to describe a school
system which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution.").
66. Green, 391 U.S. at 437.
67. Id.at 439-40.
68. Id. at 440-41.
69. Id. at 441-42.
70. Id.at 435-36; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1971) (highlighting the Green factors); Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III,
CharterSchools Under the NCLB: Choice andEqualEducationalOpportunity,22 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 165, 169 (2007).
71. Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
72. Id at 459.
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ordered the school district to develop alternative solutions that would
accelerate desegregation.
On the same day, the Court also struck down the choice plan in Raney
v. Board of Education of Gould School District7 3 because, after three years,
no white student had enrolled in a black school and 85% of black students
were still in black schools.74 The Court viewed the choice program as a tactic
designed to place the burden on parents to further desegregation rather than
school authorities where it rightly belonged.75 Additionally, the Court
until the district created a
empowered the district court to retain jurisdiction
76
plan that addressed segregation speedily.
3. Expanded JudicialRemedial Power
Advancing the Green factors, the Supreme Court, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,77 warned that a prima facie
Equal Protection Clause violation will be established if the racial identity of
a school can be easily determined by looking at its facilities' quality, staff
and faculty racial distribution, and sports organization. 78 Additionally, the
Court ruled that school officials do not have to be colorblind when assigning
teachers to schools. 79 Further expanding judicial power, the Court declared
that "[w]hen school authorities present a district court with a 'loaded game
board,' affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance
zones is proper to achieve truly non-discriminatory assignments. 8 °
The Swann Court held that if school authorities fail to develop a plan
that would effectively ensure desegregation, courts could use a variety of
remedies. 8 These remedies included limited use of quotas as a starting point
in remedying past discrimination, as well as interdistrict remedies, such as
busing, changes in attendance zones, and pairing of noncontiguous school
zones.8 2 The Court declared that "[i]f school authorities fail in their
affirmative obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be
invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Raney v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 449.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 18-19; see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973).
Swann, 402 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 25-31.
Id.
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court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."83
The Court also urged lower courts to closely scrutinize one-race schools
or predominantly one-race schools to ensure that the racial composition is
not due to past or present discrimination.84 A year later, in Wright v. Council
of Emporia,85 the Court extended judicial remedial powers after a choice
program failed to lead to meaningful change. 86 Specifically, in spite of the
choice program, white students failed to attend black schools; only 98 of
2,510 black students attended white schools, and the faculty was wholly
segregated. 7 Moreover, the Court empowered lower courts to block a unit
of a segregated school district from creating a new district as long as de jure
segregation remained. 88 In this, the Court blocked creation of a choice
district for white students.
4. Deflating JudicialLatitude
The following year after Wright, the Court reexamined the judicial
power of redress in segregation cases in Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver.89 In Keyes, the district was accused of intentional segregation in
some parts of the school system through gerrymandering attendance zones,
strategically locating school buildings, manipulating school sizes, and using
mobile classrooms to evade desegregation.9" The Court ruled that where
intentional segregation is found in a meaningful part of a school system, a
court's desegregation order could encompass the entire school system,
unless school officials show that segregation in other parts of the school
system were not due to intentional acts.9
However, in requiring
intentionality, the Court also took away the remedial latitude of courts. Thus
began the journey toward judicial retreat from desegregation enforcement.
92
This was further evident in Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler,
83. Id. at 15. In this, the Court broadened judicial authority.
84. Id. at 25-27.
85. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 455.
88. Id. at 460-66; see also United States v. Scot. Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972)
(holding similarly about a choice program). The Supreme Court found in ScotlandNeck that
the district's choice plan "produced very little actual desegregation." Id. at 485-486. Further,
the Court observed that, if allowed, the new district would be a "refuge for white students."
Id. at 489 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
89. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
90. Id. at 191-95.
91. Id. at 207, 211-13.
92. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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when the Supreme Court chided a district court for overstepping its authority
in mandating yearly readjustment of attendance zones as a segregation
remedy for demographic fluxes. 93
Then in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v.
Dowell,9 4 the Court declared that courts can dissolve desegregation decrees
if a school district has eliminated vestiges of discrimination as practicable as
possible, even when segregated schools persist. 95 This judicial willingness
to retreat from desegregation enforcement continued in Freeman v. Pitts96 as
the Court ruled that lower courts can incrementally withdraw oversight over
various Green factors before the district has attained full unitary status. The
Court also gave courts discretion to refuse to "order further remedies in the
area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a
proximate way, to constitutional violations."9 7
In addition, the Court held that while courts can order remedies for de
jure segregation, schools are under no obligation to remedy de facto
segregation, or resegregation because they are caused by private residential
choices (unless it is demonstrated that the state or school authorities
engineered the demographic patterns). 98 The FreemanCourt also ruled that,
"[a]s the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior dejure system." 99 This
represents another example of judicial disengagement, as the Court had
earlier ruled in Keyes that time remoteness was not a viable defense if dejure
100
segregation effects linger.
In Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 1 ' the
Supreme Court diminished states' responsibility for remedying segregation
in ruling that, if a state chooses to do more than required under the Equal
Protection Clause, the state can also opt to backtrack since it is a selfimposed obligation. 102 In dissent, Justice Marshall expressed displeasure

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
it does
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 434-35.
Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Id. at 249-51.
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 496. "Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices,
not have constitutional implications." Id. at 495.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S: 189, 210-11 (1973).
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
Id. at 527.
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that the Court's decision placed "yet another burden in the path of those
seeking to counter the effects of nearly three centuries of racial prejudice."10 3
Both Milliken v. Bradley10 4 and Missouri v. Jenkins °5 are notable for
taking away the authority of courts to order interdistrict remedies for
intradistrict segregation. In Milliken, Justice Douglas disagreed with the
majority's rejection of interdistrict remedies, warning that it "will likely put
the problems of the blacks and our society back to the period that antedated
the 'separate but equal' regime of Plessy v. Ferguson."' 6 Nevertheless, the
Court rejected plaintiffs' request to include surrounding suburban districts in
their desegregation order as an attempt to attract white students from those
districts to the desegregating district.I 7 It reasoned that since those suburban
districts were not involved in the de jure desegregation violations of the
defendant districts, courts have no power to include them in any remedy. 108
On the other hand, courts can impose interdistrict remedies if "racially
school
discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single
10 9
district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."'
These interdistrict rules also apply to magnet programs, and presumably
choice programs, designed to attract students from surrounding districts as
part of desegregation efforts. " 0 Professor Osamudia James aptly captures
the fallacy and illusion of school choice, even in Milliken:
Milliken stands out as a notable example of choice in education, not because
it affirmed an explicit school-choice policy, but because it further protected
the choices of privileged parents to escape to the suburbs and ultimately
avoid participation in state-ordered remedies to dismantle the segregated
system that had conferred racial privilege on them. While protecting those
choices, the Court ignored the absence of choice among poor parents and
families within the city, who had little ability to move to the suburbs, and
who were left with precious few options, given that both remediation of de
facto segregation and interdistrict remedies were unavailable."'

Weakening of judicial remedial recourse continued in Missouri v.
Jenkins when the Court ruled that the judiciary could not mandate the state
to keep funding remedial quality education in segregated districts simply
103.
104.
105.
106.
various
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 562-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This has proven to be the case in
parts of the country. See Guzman, supra note 36.
See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76-77; Milliken, 418 U.S. at 757 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 757 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 745 (majority opinion).
See id. at 717; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 70.
James, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
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because student achievement in those districts were at or below the national
standards."' Moreover, the Court ruled that the judiciary has no remedial
power to mandate across-the-board pay increases for teachers in efforts to
improve the lure of the desegregating district. 1 3 The Court also disentangled
racial balancing from desegregation, noting that desegregation does not
require racial balancing; thus, one-race schools or virtually one-race schools
are constitutional as long as they are not segregated due to government
action. 114 As legal author Jane Tanimura notes, "By the 1990s federal courts
were virtually powerless to remedy segregation." 1 5
5. The Quick Demise of Voluntary Race-Conscious Plans
With the Supreme Court constricting the path to judicial decrees as a
remedy for segregation, school districts interested in continued
desegregation adopted voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans
designed to reflect the district's racial composition. The Supreme Court,
however, limited the use of such plans by recognizing only two compelling
interests under strict scrutiny standard for use of race in the education
context. 1 16 These interests are (1) student diversity and (2) remedy of past
intentional discrimination if the district has not achieved unitary status.117
This diversity, however, does not encompass racial balance.
In Parents Involved, where the Seattle School District as well as the
Jefferson County Public Schools used race-conscious measures to promote
diverse student bodies, the Court stated that "[r]acial balancing is not
transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest
simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.' 11 8 Instead, constitutional use of
diversity is limited to consideration of race as one of various factors in
student assignments. 1 9 The Court relied on Justice Powell's plurality
112. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 100-01.
113. Id. at 110-14.
114. See id. at 116-17 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken, 418 U.S. at 765-90.
115. Tanimura, supra note 10, at 404.
116. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Tanimura, supra
note 10, at 408 ("While the cases of the 1970s and 1990s limit how federal courts can remedy
school segregation, Parents Involved additionally limits how elected school boards can
remedy it.").
117. See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720-22.
118. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 722-23, 793; see also id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Joseph 0. Oluwole
& Preston C. Green, III, GratingRace-Conscious Student Assignment Plans in the Cauldron
of Parents Involved v. Seattle School District, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1655 (2010) [hereinafter
Grating].
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opinion in a higher education case, finding "diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element."12 Thus, today, elementary and secondary schools can
similarly only use race as a plus factor in student assignments, not as a
dispositive factor.
Even after a compelling interest in diversity is shown, pursuant to the
narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test, the school must ensure that
students are not individually typed by race. Further, diversity cannot be
conceptualized
as
simply
binary
racial
categories
such
as
"white/nonwhite."' 21 Additionally, to satisfy strict scrutiny, the school
district must show that it seriously considered, in good faith, race-neutral
alternatives before it adopted the race-conscious plan. 2' Even then, courts
are not allowed to simply accept the district's showing; instead, they must
conduct a searching review to ensure that there is indeed no viable raceneutral alternative.12 3 While the Supreme Court has indicated that districts
do not have to exhaust race-neutral alternatives before choosing a raceconscious plan, this searching review requirement suggests otherwise.
The Court also rejected the suggestion that voluntary race-conscious
plans should be subject to a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny simply
because such plans are for beneficial purposes, such as promoting
diversity.124 The Court emphasized that all distributions of benefits or
benefits based on race must be subject to strict scrutiny because racial
classifications are "simply too pernicious."' 25 Most recently, the Supreme
Court ruled that neither the United States Constitution nor Court precedent
give the judiciary authority to overturn voter-passed state constitutional
amendments banning affirmative action in public education. 126 The
weakened judicial oversight and investment in desegregation has fueled
27
segregated charter schools. 1

120. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315; see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322-25 (2003).
121. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 723.
122. Id. at 735 (plurality opinion); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
123. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013).
124. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 722-23; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379-80 (Rehnquist,

C.J., dissenting).
125. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720.

126. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1630-38 (2014).

127. See Racial-Balancing,supranote 16, at 15-21. This is not surprising because charter
schools are governed by the desegregation precedents.
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With the majority of almost 200 desegregation cases stalled in the
judicial system for so many decades, 128 it is time to look for an alternate
solution. Some form ofjudicial intervention or decree, rather than voluntary
plans or desegregation litigation, might be the more viable solution going
forward. Hence, the need for a standard such as the separate-but-equal
doctrine that courts can use as an anchor to enforce, at minimum, equality.
As discussed next, school finance litigation has not been the expected
solution.
B.

School FinanceLitigation and Deference
1. Early Optimism in School Finance Litigation

School finance litigation is designed to secure additional funding for
schools, or substantial funding equality, in order to promote equal
educational opportunity.129 The first attempt to promote equal educational
opportunity through school finance litigation was in California in Serrano v.
Priest,30 where plaintiffs claimed that the unequal funding of the state's
school districts was unconstitutional under the United States Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause. 3 ' As early as 1855, there was discrimination in
school funding with the state law requiring allocation of the State School
Fund based on the census of white children. 13 2 However, for most of
California history, schools were funded through local taxes, creating
significant per-pupil disparities across districts based on property value
differences and tax rate variations.13 3 The Supreme Court of California held
that, since the state school financing system created substantial disparities
among school districts, the system "invidiously discriminate[d] against the
poor."' 34 Furthermore, the court ruled that classifications that discriminate
against the poor must be invalidated unless the government satisfies the strict
scrutiny standard of review by showing that the classification is narrowly

128. Holley-Walker, supra note 19, at 424, 433 n.3.
129. See Aronson, supra note 27, at 401-06.

130. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano]),487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
131. Id. at 1244.
132. Charles Wollenberg, Mendez v. Westminster: Race, Nationality and Segregation in
CaliforniaSchools, 53 CAL. HIST. Q. 317, 317 (1974).
133. Margaret Weston, Just the facts: FinancingCalifornia'sPublic Schools, PUB.POL'Y
INST. OF CAL. (Nov. 2011), https://perma.cc/WGZ4-86YL. The state share has surpassed the
local share due to reforms after successful school finance litigation in the Serrano cases. See
generally id.; STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., CALIFORNIA's K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS: How ARE

THEY DOING?, (2005) (ebook) (describing California schools' population, resources, and
scores to others around the nation).
134. SerranoI, 487 P.2d at 1244.
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tailored to a compelling interest.135 In order to qualify for strict scrutiny
review, a fundamental right must be infringed or discrimination must involve
a suspect class.' 36 The court determined that wealth is a suspect class and
education a fundamental right; thus, under either strand of the strict scrutiny
standard, the school financing system was deemed unconstitutional under the
37
United States Constitution. 1
2. The Rise of Pessimism in School Finance Litigation
The United States Supreme Court first reviewed the constitutionality of
school financing systems in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.'38 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged Texas's system for
funding local public schools through property taxes as an inequitable system
that hindered equal educational opportunity in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.'
The Supreme Court ruled that education was not a
fundamental right under the federal constitution and wealth was not a suspect
classification. 4 ° Therefore, rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny
applied.14 ' Under this standard, courts will uphold a school financing system
if it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. 142 In this case, the Court
found the legitimate interest to be the local control of education as manifest
14
in the local property taxation system for funding local schools.
Disappointingly, the Court so concluded despite the inequality evident in the
fact that the ten wealthiest districts each raised $610 per student from over
$100,000 each in taxable property per student compared to the four poorest
districts each raising $63 per student from less than $10,000 each in taxable
property per student.'" The poor districts consequently found it difficult to
hire highly-qualified teachers. 141
At the core of rational basis review is judicial deference. This deference
is evident in the Court's decision to uphold the school financing system
against constitutional challenge. It is likewise evident in the Court
declaration that "[w]e are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
135. Id. at 1250-55.
136. Jerry R. Parkinson, The Use of Competency Testing in the Evaluation of Public
School Teachers, 39 U. KAN. L. REv. 845, 875 (1991).
137. Serranol, 487 P.2d at 1263.
138. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
139. Id. at 5-6.
140. Id. at 55.
141. Id. at44-45.
142. Id. at 55.
143. Id.at 54.
144. Id.at 74-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. Hinojosa & Walters, supra note 61, at 597-98.
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wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities
in 50 States, especially where the alternatives proposed are only recently
'
In all, the Supreme Court adopted a
conceived and nowhere yet tested."146
race-neutral approach to school finance litigation in applying the rational
basis deference standard.' 4 7 Justice Marshall protested the Court's decision,
from our historic commitment to equality of
characterizing it as a "retreat
48
educational opportunity." 1
3. Searchingfor a School Finance Silver Lining in State Constitutions
After the United States Supreme Court rejected use of the Equal
Protection Clause for redress of educational inequality perpetuated through
the school finance system, those seeking equal educational opportunities
looked to state constitutions. This was done through equity litigation under
the state's equal protection provision or adequacy litigation under the state's
education provision that obligates the state to provide public education."'
Equity litigation aimed for equal per-pupil expenditures in all districts to
ensure that district wealth was not a determinant .of educational
opportunity. 5 0 Adequacy litigation focused on education output rather than

146. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
147. Racial-Balancing,supra note 16, at 42-45.
148. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Hinojosa & Walters, supra
note 61, at 596-628; William E. Thro, JudicialAnalysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994).
The distinction between the two forms of school finance litigation was astutely elucidated in
an adequacy case where the court stated that "[t]he essential issues in this case are quality and
equality of education [adequacy litigation]. The issue is not, as insisted by the defendants and
intervenors, equality of funding [equity litigation]." Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter,
851 S.W.2d 139, 156 (Tenn. 1993). Here is another way to look at adequacy litigation and
equity litigation: "Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal
spending per pupil or spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated children.
Adequacy has been understood to require a level of spending sufficient to satisfy some
absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold. In practice, however, many courts
interpreting their states' constitutional obligations have fused the equality and adequacy
theories." Weishart, supra note 9, at 477. In this article, equity litigation and adequacy
litigation are used synonymously to refer to equal educational opportunity for minority
students.
150. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS
AS POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION (2003); Aronson, supra note 27, at
425.
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the funding input.151 While adequacy litigation was relatively more
successful than equity litigation, neither has had meaningful sustained
52
impact on minority education. 1
Subsequent to San Antonio Independent School District,the California
Supreme Court again reviewed the state's school financing system in
Serrano v. Priest.153 Unlike SerranoI, which involved a challenge under the
federal constitution, Serrano 1I examined whether the state constitution
provided a remedy to those denied equal educational opportunities under the
school financing system. 154 The court found the system unconstitutional
because education is a fundamental right under the state constitution and
wealth is a suspect class.155
While both adequacy and equity litigation have led to some reforms in
school financing systems and consequent funding of education, 156 minority
students are still searching for the fruits of the efforts.' 57 The key deficiency
arises from the failure of school finance litigation to address racial
disparities, as litigants have been forced to rely on district wealth as the
suspect class element of local property tax variations. California voters also
passed Proposition 13, which limited property tax rates and annual property
tax increases. 158 This proposition constricted the ability to fund equal
educational opportunities in schools. 5 9 The United States Supreme Court
upheld Proposition 13 in Nordlingerv. Hahn, stating that it was best to defer
to the state pursuant to the rational basis standard. 6 0
"Both the post-Brown desegregation litigation and the state funding
litigation that followed suffered from a common problem: the courts were
troubled by the antidemocratic nature of dictating education policy and
151. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-16 (Ky. 1989);
Aronson, supra note 27, at 405-06; Koski, supra note 8, at 88-89 (discussing the effects of
budget-based layoffs).
152. See LUKEMEYER, supra note 150; John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding
Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND.L. REv. 2351 (2004); see also Weishart, supra
note 9 ("Part of the problem is the growing reluctance of state courts to continue to supervise
school finance cases and consistently intervene in budgetary considerations thought properly
reserved for the political branches, especially during times of economic downturn.").
153. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
154. Id.at 949-50. California's equal protection clause states that "[a] person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of
the laws." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a).
155. Serrano 11,557 P.2d at 951.
156. See Koski, supra note 8, at 88-89.
157. See Prieto, supra note 26, at 94.
158. CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 1(a) (1978); Prieto, supra note 26, at 92-93.
159. CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 1(a); Prieto, supra note 26, at 92-93.
160. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1992).
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funding decisions from the bench, and retreated from that role.'" 16 ' Thus,
those pursuing equal educational opportunities looked for an alternative
litigation strategy--one that courts would not perceive as a judicial dictate
of policy but rather as devolution of policy from state to district control. 62
This alternative approach took the form of a constitutional challenge to state
tenure and dismissal statutes in California in a bid to give local districts more
control 163 over teachers in the pursuit of equal educational opportunities for
minorities."6
C.

Vergara, Teacher Tenure Litigation, andDeference
1. Renewed JudicialEngagement?

In 20 14, it appeared that the judiciary would once again use its powers
to enforce educational equality when Los Angeles County Superior Court
Judge Treu held California's tenure and dismissal statutes unconstitutional
for denying minorities equal educational opportunities.' 6 5 The plaintiffs
161. Note, supranote 30, at 937-38.
162. Id. at 938.
163. In relation to the challenged statutes, this local devolution was intended to play out
as follows:
In California, rather than granting teachers permanent employment status within
two years, districts could exercise discretion over whether to retain teachers; rather
than follow state-mandated steps for dismissing teachers, they could follow their
own Due Process Clause-compliant approaches; and rather than lay off teachers in
reverse order of seniority, they could develop their own prioritization processes.
Districts could, by policy or contract, adopt employment terms similar to those
previously imposed at the state level, or they could provide different terms.
Id. at 942.
164. Id. at 938-39. An interesting point of note is that most school finance cases in their
pursuit of educational resources failed to include teachers even though teachers have been
identified as the most important input within the school; and despite the fact that teacher
salaries typically represent the largest budget item for schools. See Black, supra note 8, at
1626-27. Further, Professor Black reports that a "review of the [school finance litigation]
victories reveals four different responses to the issue of teachers: 'avoidance,
oversimplification, flawed analysis, and focused attention. The first three categories consume
nearly the entirety of the case law, with the fourth representing the outliers." Id. at 1627.
165. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014),
rev'd, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); see also Jacqueline A. Meese, Note,
Expectations of the Exemplar: An Exploration of the Burdens on Public School Teachers in
the Absence of Tenure, 19 CUNY L. REv. 131, 137-40 (2015). Judge Treu was the first judge
in the country to find such a violation in tenure and dismissal statutes. Aronson, supra note
27, at 395. The statutes challenged were the Permanent Employment Statute, Dismissal
Statutes and the Last-In-First-Out law (tenure laws). CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44929.21(b),
44934, 44938, 44944, 44955 (West 2018); Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2. For a
discussion of other cases, see Regina Umpstead et al., An Analysis of State Teacher Evaluation
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brought a state equal protection claim arguing that the tenure and dismissal
statutes deprived them of equal educational opportunities because minority
schools disproportionately received grossly ineffective teachers. Judge Treu
ruled that the statutes "impose a real and appreciable impact on students'
fundamental right to equality of education and that they impose a
disproportionate burden on poor and minority students." 166 The court
recognized that
the most vulnerable students, those attending high-poverty, low-performing
schools, are far more likely than their wealthier peers to attend schools
having a disproportionate number of underqualified, inexperienced, out-offield, and ineffective teachers and administrators. Because minority children
disproportionately attend
such schools, minority students bear the brunt of
67
staffing inequalities. 1
Since the court determined that a fundamental right to education was
implicated, it applied strict scrutiny. It concluded that the state had no
compelling reason for its tenure and dismissal statutes that resulted in a
disproportionate impact on the education of minorities. 168 The court
reasoned that the statutes made it difficult to provide minority students highquality teachers because teachers were tenured after two years, which was
too brief to fully evaluate teacher quality and that the time, as well as cost,
to dismiss grossly ineffective teachers was burdensome to schools. 169 The
dance of lemons also led principals in search of improved teacher quality to
transfer their lower-quality tenured teachers to minority schools since the
dismissal process was too cumbersome. 170 Additionally, the court ruled that
minority students were denied equal educational opportunity because, in
reduction-in-force situations, the school was forced to retain ineffective
tenured teachers over more effective probationary teachers. 171 The court did
not dictate policy; rather, it ruled that the current laws could not be enforced
72
thus devolving control to the local districts. 1

Laws Enacted in Response to the FederalRace to the Top Initiative, 286 EDUC. L. REP. 795
(2013).

166. Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4. Critics argued
a causal relationship between teacher tenure and education
We Have to Do Better: Attacking Teacher Tenure is Not the
81 Mo. L. REv. 537, 559 (2016).
167. Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *7.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Note, supra note 30, at 940 ("The court did
particular law, nor did it order districts to adopt any policies
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There was a lot of excitement about Judge Treu's decision. For
example, author Michele Aronson characterized it as a "landmark"
decision. 173 Judge Treu's decision "substantiate[d] the premise that any state
policy that systematically and substantially impedes educational
opportunity-whether financially or otherwise-is unconstitutional."' 7 4 The
victory, however, was fleeting.
2. EntrenchingDeference: Closing Tenure andDismissalStatutes as
Remedial Doors
The court of appeals reversed Judge Treu's decision finding that the
legislature was entitled to deference in the tenure and dismissal statutes
because they served a legitimate purpose.' 75 The court ruled that "statutes
relating to education are provided a presumption of constitutionality, and
doubts are resolved in favor of a finding of validity."' 1 76 Furthermore, in
order to establish constitutional deficiency, the plaintiffs had to show that the
statutes in question actually caused grossly ineffective teachers to be
assigned to minority students. 17 7 Because the equal protection challenge to
the statutes was a facial challenge, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could
show this in one of two ways: either the statutory text mandated the
disproportionate assignment of students; or the assignment was inevitable in
light of the statute. 17' As the court noted, it was evident that the statutory
text did not provide for assignment of grossly ineffective teachers to minority
students. 179 As such, the only premise for plaintiffs to succeed was to show
the inevitability of the disproportionate assignment. This required plaintiffs
to show that "any implementation of the statutes inevitably resulted in the
consequential assignment of disproportionately high numbers of grossly
inefficient teachers to schools predominantly serving low-income and
minority []students."' 8 °

legislation. It ruled only that the continued enforcement of these state-level laws would
violate the state constitution.").
173. Aronson, supra note 27, at 395; see also Michael J. DeJianne, Comment, The Right
to Education: Reconciling Teacher Tenure and the Current State of Public Education, 46
SETON HALL L. REv. 333, 352-54 (2015) (arguing the California appellate court should
uphold Judge Treu's ruling).
174. Black, supra note 8, at 1602.
175. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 553-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
176. Id. at 550.
177. Id. at 557-58.
178. Id.
179. Id.at 554-57.
180. Id. at 555-56 (emphasis added).
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The court found that the legislature allowed local administrators to have
discretion on teacher assignments, and these assignments were made at the
local level based on local policies, collective bargaining agreements, and
teacher preferences. 18'
Therefore, any challenge to the inequitable
assignment of teachers must be at the local level rather than the statutory
level. Accordingly, the court deferred to the legislature, affording no
remedies to the minority students; despite the fact that the court conceded
' 182
that "[t]he evidence also revealed deplorable staffing decisions."
In determining that local decision-making, rather than the statutory
scheme, caused the disproportionate assignment, the court conveniently used
proximate causation rather than but-for causation, which allowed the court
to restrict what would pass muster as statutory causation. 183 This decision
effectively precludes minority students from seeking equal protection
remedies for disproportionate assignments of grossly ineffective teachers
based on California's tenure and dismissal statutes and this continues the
judicial pattern of deference.
With entrenched judicial deference foreclosing various avenues for
minorities in segregated schools, including charter schools, to seek judicial
remedy, we must look for yet another avenue. Next, this Article presents the
separate-but-equal doctrine as such an avenue.
I.

SEPARATE-BUT-EQUAL DOCTRINE

Part II discusses the Plessy decision as well as the various legal
standards that emerged of the separate-but-equal era, which lasted from
Plessy until Brown L.184

A.

The Emergence of the Separate-But-EqualEra

Plessy held state law requiring separate-but-equal passenger train
coaches for minorities and whites constitutional. 185 The Court ruled that
while states had the prerogative to separate the races, they were
constitutionally obligated to provide equality. 186 Concededly, Plessy was a
181. Id. at 556-58.
182. Id.at 558.
183. Id.at554-57.
184. See, e.g., Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., The Promise of America, 37 CARDozo L. REV.
1167 (2016).
185. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-51 (1896); see generally Sheldon Novick,
Homer Plessy's Forgotten Pleafor Inclusion: Seeing Color, Erasing Color-Lines, 118 W.
VA. L. REv. 1181 (2016) (discussing the background story of the Plessy litigation strategy).
186. Brown 1,347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-51; see also Green, III
et al., supra note 31, at 290-97.
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railroad case, but the Court extended the separate-but-equal doctrine to
education in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education.187 The
Supreme Court affirmed the separate-but-equal doctrine in GongLum v. Rice
when it ruled that a Chinese American student was not denied her Equal
Protection rights when she was denied admission to a white school and
required to attend a black school with equal facilities to that of white
schools. 188
After Plessy, the judiciary generally made concerted efforts to enforce
the equality requirement of the separate-but-equal doctrine, encouraging
lawsuits in the quest for equal educational opportunities. 189 For as Justice
Marshall eloquently stated, "even before this Court recognized its duty to
tear down the barriers of state-enforced racial segregation in public
education, it acknowledged that inequality in the educational facilities
provided to students may be discriminatory state action as contemplated by
the Equal Protection Clause." 9 '
B.

Is There Placefor Equality in the Separate-But-EqualDoctrine?

Due to the failure of school desegregation jurisprudence to address
racial issues in funding and the failure of school finance jurisprudence to
address issues of race, the separate-but-equal doctrine could provide a means
for ensuring that black and Latino resources are equal to those in white
districts. Author Rick Guzman observes that "many African-American and
minority students would in many ways be better-off under the doctrine of
'separate but equal' than under today's watered-down interpretation of the
Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which struck
With de facto
down 'separate but equal' as unconstitutional."19' 1
desegregation out of remedial reach of both the judiciary and voluntary
school action, and without a Supreme Court ruling allowing remedy of de

187. Cumming v. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
188. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 79-87 (1927).
189. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004
(D. Ariz. 1951); MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR
AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH (1992); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

(First

Vintage Books ed., 2004); JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF
JIM CROW (2002); Jeanne M. Powers, On SeparatePaths: The Mexican American and African

American Legal CampaignsAgainst School Segregation,121 AM. J. EDUC. 29 (2014); Jeanne
M. Powers & Lirio Patton, Between Mendez and Brown: Gonzales v. Sheely (1951) and the

Legal CampaignAgainst Segregation,33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 127 (2008).
190. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973).
191. Guzman, supra note 36, at 151.
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facto segregation based on Brown, a de facto separate-but-equal doctrine
192
would help enforce equality.
While Plessy mandated substantial equality as the governing standard
during the separate-but-equal era, courts relied on three different equality
standards in enforcing substantial equality: nominal equality, racial equality,
and real equality.' 9 3 The nominal-equality standard allowed segregated
schools so long as facilities were substantially equal between the white and
minority schools. However, under this standard, the substantial-equality
requirement was a nominal victory because it still allowed disparities in
funding.' 94 The racial-equality lens also allowed states to preserve and
continue the funding disparities as long as the state had racially-neutral
justification for them.' 95 The real-equality standard, however, changed this
trend as courts looked for real substantial equality in resources between
white schools and minority schools. The courts scrutinized segregated
schools for equality in curriculum and instructional resources, libraries,
teacher quality, accreditation, teacher salaries, funding, facilities, and other
educational inputs.'9 6
State ex rel. Brewton v. Board ofEducation197 relied on the real-equality
standard when it found the practice of providing an aeromechanics course at
a white school and not at the black school unconstitutional. 98 The court
pointed out that the course was taught for three hours a day-a significant
part of the student's day-and critical to a career as an airplane mechanic.199
Since black students did not have the course at their school, they were
effectively denied the opportunity to pursue such a career. 2 °" Accordingly,
the court stated that "we think that this course in aeromechanics is so
complete and so important in this day and age that its denial would prevent
21
substantial equality.",
192. In other words, in light of the lack of judiciary remedy for de facto segregation (and
amidst the continuing de facto segregation), we must ensure equality; that is what this Article
means when referencing the de facto-separate-but-equal doctrine.
193. See Racial-Balancing,supra note 16, at 10-12.
194. See Jones v. Bd. of Educ., 217 P. 400 (Okla. 1923).
195. See Thompson v. Gibbes, 60 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.S.C. 1945); Turner v. Keefe, 50 F.
Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla 1943).
196. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 143-52 (Del. 1952); State ex rel. Brewton v. Bd. of Educ.,
233 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1950).
197. Brewton, 233 S.W.2d at 699.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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In accord, Gebhartv. Belton called for substantial equality after finding
real inequality in class sizes, facilities, transportation, teacher salaries, and
funding between white and black schools.102 The court observed that
absolute equality is neither required nor practical; only substantial equality
is required. 2 3 The real-equality standard was the linchpin of the heart of the
separate-but-equal doctrine that was intended to foster actual substantial
equality, though its embrace of segregation was wrong.
Professor Joyner reports that black students actually performed better
under the separate-but-equal era than they currently do in the post-Brown
era.2" 4 The Supreme Court itself acknowledged in Brown I that under the
separate-but-equal doctrine, "many [blacks] have achieved outstanding
success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional
world."2 5 Even as the Court declared that separateness was inherently
unequal, 2 6 it observed that the separate-but-equal doctrine had led to or was
leading to equality "with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors. ' 2 7 Dedicated minorities
made "segregated African-American schools into models of academic
excellence" grounded in well-qualified and tireless black teachers as well as
between home and school with
strong parent involvement and collaboration
20 8
a solid sense of pride in the local schools.
Professor Joyner points out that in North Carolina, for example, under
the separate-but-equal doctrine:
African-American school officials knew that their graduates were equally or
better prepared academically than were similarly situated White students and
that the biggest problem these students would encounter in the future would
be racial bias, prejudice and discrimination from the larger American society.
As such, students were imbued with the truism that they had to be three or
four times better prepared than the White graduates209against whom they
would compete for jobs and other economic benefits.

202. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 143-52 (Del. 1952). The United States Supreme
Court overturned this case in Brown I when it ruled that segregated schooling was
unconstitutional even with equality. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
203. Gebhart,91 A.2d at 143.
204. Joyner, supra note 6, at 167, 174, 199; see also Drew S. Days, I1, Brown Blues:
Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 53 (1992); Doris Y. Wilkinson,
IntegrationDilemmas in a Racist Culture, Soc'Y, March 1996, at 27, 27-31.
205. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 490; see also Joyner, supranote 6.
206. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
207. Id. at 492.
208. Joyner, supra note 6, at 162, 166-167, 172; see id. at 166-167, 172 (discussing the
impact of segregation in schools on the African-American community).
209. Joyner, supra note 6, at 167.
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What has become evident since Brown is that "[i]t cannot be said that
' 210
Brown was a panacea for the nation's ills on the issue of equality."
Inequality has also been exacerbated by the Supreme Court's alacrity for
resource distribution through a "colorblind, race-neutral baseline ' 21 1 rather
than the race-conscious approach that would support equal educational
212
opportunities for minorities.
III. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SEGREGATION

Part III discusses the state of charter school segregation in California as
a cautionary note for other states. California is particularly apropos because,
when most people think of segregation, they usually do not think of
California. However, California, as a progressive state with segregation,
illustrates that segregation can exist anywhere.
A.

California:A CautionaryNote for Other States

Many California students are educated in segregated and unequal
settings. 213 In the 1800s, the state school superintendent, who wholly
supported the state's discriminatory school funding law that used a whitechildren-only census, stated that schools would be destroyed if raciallyintegrated education was enforced.2 14 He was so opposed to integration that
he declared "[t]he great mass of our [white] citizens will not associate in
terms of equality with these inferior races; nor will they consent that their
'
children should do so." 215
With like thinking, the legislature enacted a law
barring minorities from integrated schools while authorizing separate
schools.2 16 This continued until the 1870s when black and Indian students
were allowed to attend white schools if their community did not have
separate facilities for them.2 17

210. Greenaway, supra note 184, at 1183.
211. Spann, supra note 29, at 585.
212. See generally, Elizabeth A. Campbell & Tanya M. Marcum, The Searchfor Equality
Through the Rule of Law, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1 (2016) (examining the evolution of
preferential treatment).
213. See Civil Rights Project, supranote 62; Gary Miron et al., Schools Without Diversity:
EducationManagement Organizations,CharterSchools, and the DemographicStratification
of the American School System, EDUC. & PuB. INT. CTR. AND EDUC. POL'Y REs. UNIT (Feb.

2010), https://perma.cc/BT7A-7ZD9; Orfield & Ee, supra note 3.
214. Wollenberg, supra note 132, at 318.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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In 1874, the Supreme Court of California emphasized that the separatebut-equal rule governed black students' schooling and thus, black students
were entitled to segregated education.2 18 Black students eventually gained
full rights to attend white schools in 1890, although Indian students
continued to face de jure segregation.21 9 In fact, the Supreme Court of
California held that the segregation of Indian students did not violate the
federal and state constitutions as long as the students were provided schools
substantially equal to those provided to white students.22 ° The Chinese were
excluded from education until 1885 due to various prejudicial sentiments,
including that of the San Francisco superintendent who deemed them
virtually hopeless.2 21 Even after the Chinese were allowed to go to school,
they were subject to de jure segregation.222
School officials justified the segregation of students of Mexican descent
with the belief that they had issues with hygiene, contagious diseases, as well
as language, cultural, and intellectual inhibitions.22 3 In Westminister School
District of Orange County v. Mendez, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that school officials could not segregate
students of Mexican descent because state law did not include them in the
list of students subject to segregation (this list included Japanese, Chinese,
Mongolian, and Indian students).22 4 The court, however, noted that the state
could enact a law allowing such segregation without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.22 5
Mendez was the first case to successfully challenge segregation in
California2 26 and it was a strong impetus for the Brown I decision seven years

218. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
219. See Wysinger v. Crookshank, 23 P. 54 (Cal. 1890); Wollenberg, supra note 132, at
318.
220. Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist., 226 P. 926, 929-30 (Cal. 1924); Nicole Blalock-Moore,
Piper v. Big Pine School District of Inyo County: Indigenous Schooling and Resistance in the
Early Twentieth Century, 94 S. CAL. Q. 346 (2012). The court reasoned that the constitutional
and statutory authority only guaranteed "[e]quality, and not identity of privileges and rights."
Piper, 226 P. at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Wollenberg, supra note 132, at 318.
222. Id.
223. See Mendez v. Westminister Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946); THE
ELuSIvE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: 150 YEARS OF CHICANO/CHICANA EDUCATION (Jose F.
Moreno ed., 2008); Luis C. Moll, Mobilizing Culture,Language, and EducationalPractices:
Fulfilling the Promises of Mendez and Brown, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 451 (2010); Vicki L.
Ruiz, South by Southwest: Mexican Americans and Segregated Schooling, 1900-1950, OAH
MAG. HIST., WINTER 2001, 23.
224. Westminister, 64 F. Supp., at 544.
225. Id.
226. Moll, supra note 223, at 451; see Wollenberg, supra note 132, at 326.
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later as some of the same civil rights advocates were involved in both
22
cases. 22 7 Two months after the Brown I decision, Governor Earl Warren
signed into law a prohibition of all de jure school segregation in the state.22 9
As Professor Lisa Ramos artfully points out, "Mendez proved to be a crucial
230
blow to Chicano desegregation struggles across the Southwest.,
Historically, the state has seen resistance to desegregation in various
cities including Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Pasadena. 2 1 This has been
the case even after the 1963 California Supreme Court mandated local school
boards to desegregate. 32 Further, California has had a long history with
charter schools and segregation since becoming the second state in the nation
to enact charter school legislation in 1992.233 With neither school finance
litigation nor school desegregation jurisprudence addressing the "double
bind" of race and poverty, California like many states has failed to ensure
racial educational equality even as segregation persists through such
educational reform approaches such as charter schools. 23" This is so despite
the California Charter School Act's declared purpose to enhance educational
opportunities for all students.23 5
Moreover, California requires that petitions to create charter schools
include a comprehensive plan for achieving a racial composition in the
school that reflects the racial demographics of the school district in which
the charter school is located. 23 6 Presumably charters could be revoked if the
237
school violates this condition; however, this is ostensibly not enforced.
Lax, improvident, or ineffective enforcement has allowed segregation to

227. Powers & Patton, supra note 189 at 165-66; Lisa Y. Ramos, Dismantling
Segregation Together: Interconnections Between the Mendez v. Westminister (1946) and
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) School Segregation Cases, 37 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE
EDUC. 247, 251-254 (2004).

228. Warren is the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice who wrote for the Brown I
majority.
229. Moll, supra note 223, at 452.
230. Ramos, supra note 227, at 248.
231. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (Pasadena);
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976) (Los Angeles); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36
(1874) (San Francisco); Orfield & Ee, supra note 3.
232. Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).
233. Frankenberg et al., supra note 14, at 9; History of Charter Schools, Ill. NETWORK
CHARTER ScHs., https://perma.cc/V5E9-CG7R; Orfield & Ee, supra note 3.
234. See generally Blume et al., supra note 9; Miron et al., supra note 213; Grating,supra
note 119.
235. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601 (West 2018).

236. Id. §§ 47605(b)(5)(G); 47605.6(b)(5)(H).
237. Id.§ 47607(c).
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Besides, California's race-conscious provision might be
flourish.2 3
unconstitutional after the Supreme Court's ruling in Parents Involved,
concluding that racial balancing is not a compelling interest under the Equal
Protection Clause.23 9 Additionally, the state's constitution, Proposition 209,
hampers remedial action as it precludes race-based preferences: "[t]he State
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of... public education. 24 °
Inequality and segregation have been interlinked in California such that
a pervading sense of inequality in California schools for minority students
ignited a lawsuit for equal education opportunity in 2000 that resulted in an
almost $1 billion settlement.4 Besides, research found that about 71% of
California's charter schools are in non-suburban communities.2 42
Furthermore, the "concentration of charter schools in urban areas skews the
charter school enrollment towards having higher percentages of poor and
minority students. 24 3 Latino and Black charter school students are often in
intensely segregated schools (defined as schools with at least 90% minority
enrollment) 244 or predominantly minority schools (defined as schools with at
least 50% minority enrollment). 245 Based on their extensive research on
segregation, Civil Rights Project researchers Gary Orfield and Jongyeon Ee
believe that, in California, "[c]urrent demographic trends make full
integration impossible., 246 They also report that the state's charter school
system neglects integration.
Given the entrenched segregation consequent to the judicial failure to
confront de facto segregation, it is time to renew the fight for racial
educational equality. In light of the reality of separate schools and
educational inequality, courts should, pursuant to the separate-but-equal
doctrine, unequivocally make "clear that if whites and [blacks], or rich and
238. See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 13.
239. See Grating,supra note 119, at 1661.
240. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 1(a); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Def Affirmative Action,
Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1682 (2014); Miyasaki, supra note 9, at 162-71 (discussing Proposition 209).
241. See ACLU So. Cal., Williams v. California (2004), https://perma.cc/GR5W-AQFJ;
First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Williams v. California, No.
312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000).
242. Get the Facts: Measuring Up: What is the State of Charter Schools in California?,
NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.CHARTER SCHS.(2016), https://perma.cc/J6HT-YKM4.
243. Frankenberg et al., supra note 14, at 57 (citation omitted).
244. Id.
245. Michael A. Boozer et al., Race and School Quality since Brown v. Board of
Education, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS, 1992, at 269, 277.
246. Orfield & Ee, supra note 3, at 4.
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poor, are to be consigned to separate schools, pursuant to whatever policy,
the minimum the Constitution will require and guarantee is that for their
objectively measurable aspects these schools be run on the basis of real
equality."24' 7 While the California Supreme Court has ruled that the state
"has no duty to ensure prudent use of the equalized funds by local
administrators," the state constitution imposes on the state the obligation to
provide statewide education that is "open on equal terms to all."2
This
obligation could be enforced going forward through a judicially-recognized
de facto-separate-but-equal doctrine.2 49 In the meantime, the local control
that the courts have used to rationalize deference in the post-Brown era has
actually fueled minorities' loss of local control as charter schools, which they
have no control over, infiltrate their communities.
IV. Loss OF LOCAL CONTROL AND ROGUE AUTHORIZERS

Part IV describes the possible loss of local control over local schools if
"rogue authorizers" continue to spread as has happened in California. Such
loss of control is also facilitated through proposed charter school takeovers
of public schools and the consequent enrollment of substantial numbers of
public school students. This Part argues that it is important for the state to
retain local control by preventing outside charter authorizers from invading
minority communities that did not authorize them with resource centers and
satellite sites. If such invasion is not prevented, it could result in minority
districts being oversaturated with charter schools and the concomitant public
school loss of students and funds.2 5 °
A.

Losing Controlto Rogue Authorizers

Prior to 2002, California law placed no geographical limits on the
operation of charter schools; thus a single charter school, for instance, could
operate several school sites beyond the boundaries of the authorizing school
district.25 1 Unfortunately, with multiple sites of charter schools sometimes
located very far from the authorizer, there was very little oversight and some

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967).
Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Cal. 1992).
See footnote 192 discussing the de facto-separate-but-equal doctrine.
See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 13.
Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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charter schools engaged in abuse of public funds and other violations of
law.

252

After media reports and a criminal investigation shined a spotlight on
the abuse, in 2002, the state amended its charter school law to mandate
location of charter schools within the authorizing district with limited
exceptions. 25' The amended law provides in pertinent part:
A petition for the establishment of a charter school shall identify a single
charter school that will operate within the geographic boundaries of that
school district. A charter school may propose to operate at multiple sites
within the school district if each location is identified in the charter school
petition.

25 4

The law also requires those petitioning to start a charter school to
2 55
include in their facilities description the intended location of the school.
The statutory exception to the location requirement allows a charter
school to operate one additional site outside the school district:
(5) A charter school that is unable to locate within the jurisdiction of the
chartering school district may establish one site outside the boundaries of the
school district, but within the county in which that school district is located,
if the school district within the jurisdiction of which the charter school
proposes to operate is notified in advance of the charter petition approval,
the county superintendent of schools and the Superintendent are notified of
the location of the charter school before it commences operations, and either
of the following circumstances exists:
(A) The school has attempted to locate a single site or facility to house the
entire program, but a site or facility is unavailable in the area in which the
school chooses to locate.
(B) The site is needed for temporary use during a construction or expansion
project. 216
The location requirement as well as the exceptions also apply to charter
petitions approved on appeal by a county board of education or the state
board of education on appeal. 257 In such cases, the charter school location
258
is the district that denied the charter petition that is the basis of the appeal.
Charters of schools that fail to comply with the location law can be
252. See id. at 550; Sharon Higgins, Gateway Academy, CHARTER SCH. SCANDALS BLOG,
https://perma.cc/HQU9-75L8; Mario Koran, A Guide to the LatestCharterSchool Showdown,
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (July 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/62QF-66Q2.
253. Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass 'n, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 554.
254. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(a)(1) (West 2018).
255. Id. § 47605(g).
256. Id. § 47605(a)(5).
257. Id. §§ 47605(a)(5), 47605(j)(1), 47605.1(a), 47605.1(e).
258. Id. § 47605.1(a)(2).
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revoked. 25 9 Several of these charter school satellite sites are broadly
advertised on billboards and movie theatres targeting vulnerable students and
260
operated out of office parks and shopping malls.
Charter schools and authorizers have been accused of exploiting the
location law. For instance, Newhall School District claimed that, amidst
financial and enrollment distress, Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District
turned to charter authorizations to improve its financial state. 261 Newhall
School District alleged that Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District
authorized new charter schools to operate outside its own district but within
the county to preclude competition for its own students, despite the fact that
other districts (including Newhall School District) had rejected these charter
262
schools or were investigating them for failure to comply with the law.
Newhall School District further alleged that Acton-Agua Dulce Unified
School District charged the charters oversight and other fees as a revenue
source in excess of statutory limits. 1 63 Additionally, Newhall School District
claimed that Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District approved a charter
petition even though the petition did not specify the proposed in-district
location or the other district where an additional site would be located. 2"
The charter school then opened a site in Newhall School District without
2 65
notifying the district, as statutorily required.
The trial court ruled that Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District's
plan to use the charter authorizations for revenue contravened the state's
charter school law.266 The court also found that Acton-Agua Dulce Unified
School District violated the charter school law by failing to determine, prior
to the charter petition approval: (i) if the charter school notified Newhall

259. Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
260. See Maureen Magee, CharterChallenges Appellant Ruling to State Supreme Court,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRm., (Nov. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/2WJT-NUAY; Valerie Strauss,
Why California's CharterSchool Sector is Called 'The Wild West,' WASH. POST (Sept. 28,
2016), https://perma.cc/IIBF4-LJRA [hereinafter Wild West].

261. See Notice of Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate at 6, Newhall Sch. Dist. v.
Acton-Agua Dulce Unified Sch. Dist., No. BS149061 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014); Newhall School
District v. Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District and Albert Einstein Academy for
Letters, Arts and Sciences, CAL. CHARTER SCHS. Ass'N, https://perma.cc/FW5C-VGJJ
[hereinafter Cal. Charter Schs. Ass'n]; Lyria Boast et al., Authorizer Shopping: Lessonsfrom
Experience and Ideas for the Future, NAT'L ASS'N CHARTER SCH. AUTHOluZERS (2016),
https://perma.cc/XYH9-L6BR.

262. Notice of Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate, supranote 261, at 5-7.
263. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 47613 (West 2018) (setting statutory limits on fees for
supervisorial oversight).
264. Notice of Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 261, at 5-7.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 26; Cal. Charter Schs. Ass'n, supra note 261.
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was
School District of its intent to locate there; and (ii) if the charter school
267
unable to locate within Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District.
Although the court refused to close the charter school as Newhall
School District requested, it set aside the charter petition approval. 26 It
remanded the case for Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District to conduct
fact-finding on the two issues without any revenue motive.2 69 While
Newhall School District appealed the ruling, Acton-Agua Dulce Unified
School District approved a new charter petition compliant with the law to
replace the one challenged.2 7 ° Since the challenged charter was surrendered,
the appellate court determined the case was moot. 27' Even though a mere
substitution of charters occurred, a legally-compliant petition simply
replaced the challenged petition for a school located in Newhall School
272
District.
Another California law that charter schools have exploited in expanding
their reach into various communities is the law that allows charter schools to
establish resource centers for non-classroom-based (independent study)
programs in neighboring districts if two conditions are satisfied: (i) the
resource center is only used for students enrolled in the charter school's
independent study; and (ii) the majority of the charter school's students and
its main educational program are located in the school's home county.273
This justifiably drew the ire of local districts as they saw resource centers
infiltrate their districts. Anderson Union High School District, for example,
sued a charter school (Shasta Secondary Home School) for locating a
resource center of a charter school approved by an adjacent district (Shasta
274
Union High School District) within Anderson Union High School District.
The trial court ruled that the resource center was legal as a site for
independent study students (non-classroom-based study).27 5 The appeals
court reversed, ruling that while state law is silent on whether independentstudy charter schools can locate resource centers in other districts within
their home county, the law authorizes them to locate resource centers in

267. Notice of Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 261, at 30.
268. Id. at30-31.
269. Id. at31.
270. Newhall Sch. Dist. v. Acton-Agua Dulce Unified Sch. Dist., No. B26073 1, Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 6124, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2015).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605.1(c) (West 2018).
274. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home Sch., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d
564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Magee, supra note 260.
275. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 569.
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neighboring counties or within their authorizing district. 27 6 The Supreme
Court of California denied the Shasta Secondary Home School's request to
review the case, leaving the appeals court decision as the final disposition.277
Several other districts sent cease-and-desist letters to charter schools
operating resource centers in their districts. 27" Black and Latino students
constitute over 46% of students in these resource centers statewide. 279 This
number, however, is likely to grow as these centers target poor and minority
students.
B.

The Corruptionof Rogue Authorizers

Corruption has attended some of the location exploitations. For
instance, in 2016, Mountain Empire Unified School District superintendent
pled guilty to felony charges for collecting, for personal use, 5% of oversight
fees of charter schools the district authorized.28 ° All except one of the charter
schools his district authorized were non-classroom based schools located in
other districts.281 Some of the charters his district authorized then retained
the services of his personal charter school consulting business. 2 12 it was also
reported that Julian Union Elementary School District, a district with less
than 300 students, has received $1,542,552 in oversight fees from
authorizing charter schools run by three corporations operating several sites
outside of Julian with about 3,000 students.28 3 Grossmont Union High
School District, San Diego Unified School District, and Sweetwater Union
High School District have filed suit against Julian Union Elementary School
District and Julian Charter School for their loss of students and funds as well
as oversight concerns about the sites Julian Charter School located in their
28 4

districts.

In yet another case, San Diego UnifiedSchool Districtv. Alpine Union
School District and Albert Einstein Academy for Letters, Arts and
276. Id. at 579; Magee, supra note 260.
277. Appellate
Court
Case Information,
CAL.
CTS.
(Aug.
18,
2018),
https://perma.cc/MCX8-YA6A.
278. Koran, supra note 252.
279. Magee, supra note 260.
280. See Wild West, supra note 260.
281. Magee, supra note 260.
282. Id.
283. Wild West, supra note 260.
284. Magee, supra note 260; Koran, supra note 252; Petition for Writ of Mandate and
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. v. Julian
Union Sch. Dist., No. 37-2015-00033720-CU-WM-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015); Register of
Actions Notice, Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v Julian Union Elementary Sch. Dist., No.
37-2015-00021033-CU-MC-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015).
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Sciences,2 85 the trial court ruled that the Alpine Union School District failed
in its duty when it approved a charter petition for a charter school operating
within San Diego Unified School District which had not approved the
school.28 6 Contrary to California Education Code section 47605(a)(1),
Alpine Union School District failed to require the charter school to specify,
in its petition, a single charter school to operate within Alpine Union School
District.2 87 One could speculate that Alpine Union School District either was
negligent or turned a blind eye to the specification requirement in reviewing
the petition. Either way, there is a lingering question about oversight
deficiency and how that could, in the end, lead to missed cases of abuse as
charter schools expand into minority districts.
With an opportunity to capitalize on the lack of adequate oversight,
charter schools could engage in exploitative "authorizer shopping," aimed at
finding an authorizer that could allow them to operate with relative impunity
even if the school has a prior history of poor performance or financial
Even the National Association of Charter School
irregularities.2 88
Authorizers has expressed opposition to such authorizer shopping.2 89 Senate
Bill 1434 was introduced in California to provide opportunities for
established charter authorizers to have expanded charter school authorization
power over charter schools operating beyond their boundaries.29 °
Fortunately, the bill ultimately did not become law as it would have codified
the practice of exploiting the charter school location law as well as authorizer
shopping.
C.

Treacherous ParallelSchool Districts

Despite all of these notable concerns borne of weak oversight, some
nonprofits are championing a form of charter school takeover of public
schools-a move journalist Michael Janofsky appropriately describes as
operation of "the equivalent of a parallel school district."29' 1 The Eli and
Edythe Broad Foundation and other nonprofits, for instance, advocate for
charter schools to take over 50% of the student enrollment within the Los

285. Minute Order, San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. v. Alpine Union Sch. Dist., No. 37-201400021153-CU-MC-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014), https://perma.cc/B3E7-5RJH.
286. Id. at 6-7.
287. Id. at 5.
288. Boast et al., supra note 261, at 6; Newhall Sch. Dist. v. Acton-Agua Dulce Unified
Sch. Dist., No. B260731, Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6124 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2015).
289. Boast et al., supranote 261, at 4.
290. S. 1434, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
291. Michael Janofsky, Zimmer Accuses BroadCharterPlan of Strategy to 'BringDown'
LA USD, LA SCH.REP. (Sept. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/5EPF-H9UJ.
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Angeles Unified School District by 2023.292 They base this advocacy on the
purported success of charter schools operated by three charter school
organizations in which the Broad Foundation has invested $75 million,
ignoring other evidence showing inconsistent charter school performance. 93
The nonprofits, working through Great Public Schools Now, plan to raise
$490 million to achieve their goal, which includes adding 130,000 students
to charter schools in Los Angeles Unified School District. 94 Currently, the
nation's largest charter school program is in Los Angeles Unified School
District, where about 16% of the district's students are in charter schools. 95
If the nonprofits' goal is realized, it means that control over the education of
50% of the district's students would be divested from locals and into the
hands of charter management organizations or education management
organizations which might not be locally-based or operated.
Indeed, the plan has been criticized as an effort to "do away with
2 96
democratically controlled, publicly accountable education in LA."
Danger of widespread loss of local control lurks as advocates of the takeover
do not plan to stop with the Los Angeles Unified School District; they
believe they are creating a model for other cities.297 While not unequivocally
opposing the Great Public Schools Now proposal, three nonprofitsWeingart Foundation, California Community Foundation, and the California
Endowment-have written a letter to the Broad Foundation as well as the
Los Angeles Unified School District expressing concern, and the need to
protect family and community voice.298 In his sharp critique of the takeover
plan, Peter Greene of the Curmudgucation notes:

292. Grace Smith, CharterSchool Advocates Propose to Enroll HalfofLA USD Students
in 8 Years, EDUC. NEWS (Sept. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/A5LX-WT3V.

293. See

RON W. ZIMMER ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN EIGHT STATES: EFFECTS ON

ACHIEVEMENT, ATTAINMENT, INTEGRATION, AND COMPETITION (2009) (ebook) (providing

research on charter schools in several geographic locations); Wild West, supra note 260; Craig
Clough, Charters with Broad Support Show Only a Mixed Return on Investment, LA SCH.
REP. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/HP4B-GK6L; Frankenberg et al., supra note 14, at
13-17.
294. Larry Kaplan & Ruth McCambridge, 3 Local FoundationHeads Try to Intervene In
Broad Foundation LAUSD Plan, NONPROFIT Q. (Nov. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/SU2B9XDL; see Smith, supra note 292.
295. Smith, supra note 292.
296. Peter Greene, LA Plan to Crush Public Education, CURMUDGUCATION (Sept. 22,
2015), https://perma.cc/3RCL-GZMQ.
297. The Great Public School Now Initiative, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2015,
https://perma.cc/7425-TTSU; Greene, supra note 296.
298. Kaplan & McCambridge, supra note 294. (Letter mentioned in article on file with
Campbell Law Review).
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This is not just about educational quality (or lack thereof), or just about how
to turn education into a cash cow for a few high rollers-this is about a
hamhanded effort to circumvent democracy in a major American city.
There's nothing in this plan about listening to the parents or communitywhat is going to be done to them by men with power and
only about
29 9
money.
In addition to the loss of local control, the takeover would also threaten
the district's financial stability, reduce charter school accountability, and
make it more difficult to educate remaining students who are most in need.300
Research shows that several of the state's charter schools already have in
place discriminatory admission policies or practices that make choice an
illusion, defanging parents of their right to genuinely control their children's
education.3" 1 Steve Zimmer, president of the Los Angeles Unified School
Board, believes that the takeover plan would victimize minority students
who are already facing double segregation of poverty and race, undermining
their academic success.30 2 We need to heed Diane Ravitch's cautionary note,
in her critique of the aggressive push for school choice, if we are to retain
local control of education:
[T]he scary part is that our public schools have never before been subject to
such a sustained assault on their very foundations. Never before were there
so many people, with such vast resources, intent on dismantling public
the future of public education? What
education. What does this mean30for
3
does it mean for our democracy?
Local control should not be sacrificed for expediency. As the United
States Supreme Court has held, "local control over the educational process
affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the
structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages
experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
3 °4
excellence."

299. Greene, supranote 296.
300. Kaplan & McCambridge, supra note 294.
301. Victor Leung & Roxanne H. Alejandre, Unequal Access: How Some California
CharterSchools Illegally Restrict Enrollment,ACLU (2016), https://perma.cc/D3P9-3GTT.
302. Janofsky, supra note 291; see Deirdre Fulton, Confidential Charter School Memo
Blasted as 'Outline for a Hostile Takeover,' COMMON DREAMS (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://perma.cc/8KUY-2DVN.
303. Valerie Strauss, Ravitch: Billionaires (and Millionaires)for Education Reform,
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/J65G-3EGD.

304. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
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Fraud,Waste, and Abuse

With loss of local control sometimes comes fraud, waste, and abuse of
funds by charter school authorizers and administrators (beyond the
corruption in location exploitations discussed earlier). The United States
Department of Education Office of the Inspector General has found
significant charter school mismanagement of funds. 30 5 The California state
auditor, for instance, found "a particularly egregious example" in the Cato
School of Reason Charter School (Cato) operator, which "registered and
collected millions of taxpayer dollars for students who were actually
attending private schools."3 6 Additionally, the state's Fiscal Crisis and
Management Assistance Team determined that Oak Hills Charter School
might have misrepresented its enrollment numbers.30 7 Los Angeles Unified
School District found ABC Charter Middle School accounting, reporting,
and cash management wanting due to deficient oversight by the charter
school board and administrators.30 8 Further, a mayor of Hesperia, California,
a councilman, as well as a California Charter Academy founder, were
indicted for misappropriation of public funds ($5.5 million) from the charter
school network.30 9
There are so many more examples of such misappropriation and
waste.3 10 If rogue authorizers spread, there is no reason to believe waste,
fraud, and abuse will not follow, depriving minority students of muchneeded funds that could support equal educational opportunities. When
coupled with lax or null charter school oversight, the most vulnerable
population are minority students who are the targets of these schools. After
all, as Civil Rights Project researchers Gary Orfield and Jongyeon Ee point
out, there has emerged in California, "an entirely new system of highly
segregated charter schools" and racial educational inequality has become an

305. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Inspector General's Semiannual Report to Congress, No. 60
(May2010), https://perma.cc/KM8C-E2WV.

306. The Ctr. for Popular Democracy & Alliance to Reclaim our Schools, The Tip of the
Iceberg: Charter Schools Vulnerabilities to Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 5 (Apr. 2014),
https://perma-cc/FX6D-4TCY; see Press Release, FBI, Philadelphia Division, Head of
Charter School Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges (Aug. 13, 2013), https://perma.cc/8VVB-

YR5U.
307. The Ctr. for Popular Democracy & Alliance to Reclaim our Schools, supra note 306,
at 5-6.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 17.
310. See generally The Ctr. for Popular Democracy & Alliance to Reclaim our Schools,
supra note 306; Blume et al., supra note 9; Michael Alison Chandler, Judge Upholds
Revocation of Charter for D.C. 's Community Academy, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/TUC8-Y62U; U.S. Dept. of Educ., supra note 305.
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accepted and axiomatic norm.311 Regrettably, the lack of stringent oversight,
and its consequent impact on minorities, could be compounded in the fact
that the average yearly charter closure rate is 2.7% compared to annual
growth of 8.8%.312 This threatens the state's charter school system for the
Supreme Court of California has warned: "It is, thus, the very control and
oversight by public officials that legitimize charter schools. If monitoring
entire
and enforcement are, in reality, either lax or nonexistent, then the
3' 13
question."
into
called
is
schools
charter
governing
statutory scheme
CONCLUSION

Recently, a state appeals court ruled that California's constitutional
right to an education does not guarantee a certain educational quality or
minimum funding level.314 This is a scary thought for children as well as
civil rights supporters who would like to see more educational equity in
quality and funding. Like other cases discussed earlier herein, which limited
remedies for minority students, and in light of continued segregation, this
ruling affirms the need for a new clarion call as the vehicle for the next push
for equality: a clarion call for equality amidst Court-sanctioned de facto
segregation. This is a modified separate-but-equal doctrine that is best
characterized as a de facto-separate-but-equal doctrine.3 15 This equality
must be in key areas of quality education such as teacher salaries, highlyeffective teachers, facilities, curriculum, professional development,
pedagogical and teacher support.
The fact that courts are increasingly deferential to educational
authorities amplifies this need. As Professor Black notes, "When students'
constitutional right to education is in question, courts-more than any other
government actor-must engage and protect the right, notwithstanding the
challenges that doing so involves."'3 16 Courts must remember that "[i]n the
311. Orfield & Ee, supra note 3, at 5.
312. Get the Facts, supra note 242.
313. Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 571 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); see Wild West, supra note 260.
314. Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
315. Indeed, and understandably, the words separate but equal remind one of the
segregative practices of the Plessy era. In no way does this article call for that. Instead, it
calls for enforcement of a new type of separate-but-equal doctrine called de facto-separatebut-equal doctrine. This de facto-separate-but-equal doctrine posits that, since we have Courtsanctioned de facto segregation in schools, we must ensure equality in those schools as long
as those schools remain separate. We cannot afford to wait until the judiciary changes its
mind about de facto segregation before ensuring the equality of resources for existing
segregated school; the futures of students of color cannot wait.
316. Black, supra note 8, at 1603.
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absence of such judicial intervention, the complexity of educational
problems too often serves as a convenient excuse for legislative inaction that,
in effect, condones inequality and inadequacy." 317
The separate-but-equal doctrine might provide the way forward for
"[t]oday, the precedential value of the Court's landmark Brown v. Board of
Education decision amounts to little more than a promise that no state may
return to a system of legally required school apartheid."3'18 Rather than de
jure separate-but-equal standard championed in Plessy, we need a standard
based in today's reality--de facto separate but equal. This fight for equality
is urgent and heightened in the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos
Civiles' report that, for instance, "[t]he opportunity to integrate all or most
Californians in predominantly or even significantly white schools has long
'
since passed."319
As research and policy analysts Jenny DeMonte and
Kaitlin Pennington aptly declare, "[h]aving access to a great education
should not be determined by a child's ZIP code, race, or income. 32 °
The judiciary needs to be more involved to protect minorities' right to
equal educational opportunity. In light of current judicial deferential trends,
"civil rights groups and advocates for poor and minority children... suspect
that states will neglect disadvantaged children unless they are under strong
[judicial] pressure.
Finally, we must keep in mind that, beyond the
private benefits to minority students, there are also public benefits.
Improving the educational achievement of minority students would provide
significant boost to the United States economy through increased
productivity, taxable income, and GDP.3 22 If nothing else does, this should
make us join together in all communities to improve equal educational
opportunities for all.
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